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Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps, and the Battle of Spotsylvania
Court House
Abstract

The fighting on May 12, 1864 at Spotsylvania Court House evokes thoughts of the furious combat at the
Bloody Angle. However, there is another aspect of the fighting on May 12, that is, incidentally, at another
salient. The then-independent command of Ambrose Burnside’s Ninth Corps spent the day fighting on the
east flank of the Mule Shoe, and charging against the Confederate right flank at Heth’s Salient.
This paper has two parts: the first half analyzes the complexities and problems of Burnside’s return to the
Eastern Theater since his disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg in 1862, starting in April 1864 and culminating
with the opening moves of the Overland Campaign. In the second half the paper examines the fighting on
May 12—tactically how and why Burnside was repulsed, while strategically it examines the larger
repercussions of the fighting on May 12, including the pivotal position of Heth’s Salient in defending Lee’s
flank and reserve line.
I would like to acknowledge the staff and volunteers at the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park
for their help with this paper. Especial thanks are due to Peter Maugle, Eric Mink and Rebecca Capobianco for their
assistance in a last-minute request locating Henry Heth’s official report.
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Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps, and the
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
Ryan T. Quint
Spring had come and that meant that the
bloodletting could begin anew. For Major General
Ambrose Everett Burnside that campaign commenced on
April 13, 1864 when he arrived in Annapolis, Maryland to
rendezvous with his Ninth Army Corps. 1 Around the city
that was home to the U.S. Naval Academy the soldiers in
the corps’ three divisions milled about, drilling and
organizing. Most of the men in the divisions were brand
new recruits, learning the school of the soldier for the first
time. These recruits were shuffled into regiments shrunken
by years of arduous fighting for the Union all the way from
the North Carolina Coast in the spring of 1862 to, most
recently, the Siege of Knoxville. 2
The same day that Burnside arrived in Annapolis he
paraded the Ninth Corps in review for recently-promoted
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant. 3 As general-in-chief
1

William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1991), 345.
2
Augustus Woodbury, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside and the
Ninth Army Corps: A Narrative of Campaigns (Providence: Sidney S.
Rider & Brother, 1867), 365, 367; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses
in the American Civil War (Albany: Albany Publishing Company,
1889), 81-83.
3
A word on the convention of writing out Federal corps is useful here.
Though the practice of identifying Federal corps with Roman numerals
is the accepted practice today, during the war the corps were identified
with either regular numbers or were spelled out. I also agree with the
late Harry Pfanz, who wrote that “[F]or me…Roman numerals always
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of the United States Army, it was expected that he would
have set up his headquarters in the nation’s capital, but
Grant decided to take the field. Grant found the Ninth
Corps in “an admirable position for such a reinforcement.”
From its location Burnside’s men “could be brought at the
last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of
Norfolk, in Virginia, or North Carolina, to operate against
Richmond from that direction.” Though Grant had
witnessed these soldiers pass in review this was hardly the
reason he had come all the way to Annapolis from his field
headquarters near Culpeper; rather it was to “confer with
Burnside about the role the Ninth Corps would play in the
spring campaign….” 4
That role, Burnside soon found out, was to support
the Army of the Potomac with an overland march. On April
23 the Ninth Corps packed up its tents and formed into
marching columns. To the surprise of many of the soldiers,
the corps began to march towards Washington, D.C., not
down to the Annapolis docks. It had made its fame on a
naval expedition against North Carolina’s Outer Banks in
1862 and still had the legacy to prove it: its insignia was an
anchor and cannon, crossed over a shield. Many expected
to repeat their success at sea with another strike at a rebel
require a pause for translation that snags my train of thought.” Harry
W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987), xvii.
4
Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters (New York: Literary
Classics of the United States, 1990 reprint), 477; Brooks D. Simpson,
Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 271.
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target. 5 But this coming campaign would involve no ships
for the Ninth Corps, only grueling marches and hard
fighting.
As the corps neared Washington City a fourth
division, consisting entirely of United States Colored
Troops, was added to the corps. Burnside’s command was
now composed of close to 21,000 men and 72 cannons
ready for action. 6 Entering the capital, the corps marched
past throngs of cheering crowds while the divisions’ “soiled
and tattered flags, bearing inscriptions of battles in six
states, east and west, were silent and affecting witnesses of
their valor and their sacrifices.” 7 Crossing Long Bridge into
Virginia, the corps continued its march until, by May 5,
they were closing in on the Army of the Potomac. As the
regiments neared the battlefield, one man later wrote,
“Every soldier knew that we were about to participate in a
battle, as the booming of cannon and the rattle of musketry
were heard long before... The trail of the regiments
preceding us was made plain by the thousands of playing
cards strewn along the wayside, which they had discarded
from their blouse pockets to make room for their

5

For the naval expedition, see Marvel, 41-97; for the corps insignia see
C. McKeever, Civil War Battle flags of the Union Army and Order of
Battle (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1997 reprint), 81-82.
6
Darrell L. Collins, Army of the Potomac: Order of Battle, 1861-1865,
with Commanders, Strengths Losses, and More (Jefferson: McFarland
& Company, 2013), 168.
7
Woodbury, 368.
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testaments, which had reposed unopened, in many cases,
for weeks, in their knapsacks.” 8
For Ambrose Burnside, the march to join the Army
of the Potomac would not have marshaled good memories.
He had last seen the army after resigning its command
following the horrific defeat at Fredericksburg in
December, 1862, followed immediately by the
embarrassing “Mud March.” As Burnside prepared to leave
the army in early 1863, he remarked, “Farewell Gentlemen,
there are no pleasant reminiscences for me connected with
the Army of the Potomac.” 9 For its part, the Army of the
Potomac was not sorry to see Burnside to go, and blamed
the side-whiskered general wholeheartedly for its bloody
defeat.
Now, in the spring of 1864, Burnside was returning
to the Army of the Potomac, and it was already creating
problems. The most serious matter was that of seniority—
with Burnside’s return he should, by his commission’s date,
assume command of the Army of the Potomac, taking it
away from George Meade. Burnside had been
commissioned a major general of volunteers to date from
March 18, 1862, while Meade did not attain the same rank
8

Allen D. Albert, editor, History of the Forty-Fifth Regiment
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry 1861-1865 (Williamsport,
PA: Grit Publishing Company, 1912), 114.
9
A. Wilson Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud” in Gary W.
Gallagher, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the
Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995),
215; Francis A. O’Reilly, The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War
on the Rappahannock (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2003), 495-496.
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until November 29 of the same year. 10 No one expected or
would have allowed for Burnside to take command of the
army, and Grant settled on an independent structure for the
Ninth Corps— Burnside would report directly to Grant and
get orders from him while the other three infantry corps
would answer to Meade. It was a clunky system that would
prove largely ineffective—especially at Spotsylvania,
whose bloodiest fighting lay just under a week away. 11
The second problem facing Burnside’s return to the
Army of the Potomac, even with his independent
command, was the fact that no one within the army had any
confidence in him. Though beyond the scope of this
narrative the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness on
May 6, 1864 is worth mentioning in passing only because it
shows the lack of confidence and low expectations that
army officers had for Burnside. On the Federal left
Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps crashed through
the woods and hit elements of A.P. Hill’s Confederates—
some of the same rebels that Burnside would fight at
Spotsylvania in six days’ time. As Burnside’s corps was
coming up, his three divisions, led by Thomas Stevenson,
Robert Potter, and Orlando Willcox, were all ordered

10

George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Officers and Graduates
of the U.S. MMilitary Academy , at West Point, N.Y: Volume II (New
York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868), 191; George W. Cullum, Biographical
Regster of the Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy at West
Point, N.Y., Volume I (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868),
11
Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 48.
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forward. 12 But in the thick confines of the Wilderness the
troops were given unclear directions and “bushwhacked
toward their indistinct goal,” as one historian writes.13
Another historian, Gordon C. Rhea, wrote that “For the rest
of the morning, the [Ninth] Corps remained lost to the
Federal war effort. Occasionally messages emerged from
the undergrowth, but the troops themselves seemed to have
been swallowed up by the Wilderness.” 14
To the men and officers of the Army of the Potomac
though, it mattered little that the three divisions got lost.
What they remembered was the fact that when they needed
support, Burnside came up short. As Theodore Lyman, aide
to George Meade, met with Hancock, he reported that
Burnside was slowly making progress, to which the Second
Corps commander bellowed, “I knew it…. Just what I
expected.” 15 One of Hancock’s staff officers wrote years
later that when Burnside did finally get into action,
“assistance it could hardly be called, for, when Burnside at
last made his attack, Hancock had already been driven
back….” 16 Charles Wainwright, an artillery officer in the
Fifth Corps, wrote in his diary, “Burnside somehow is
12

The Fourth Division, commanded by Edward Ferrero, was detached
and did not take part in the Battle of the Wilderness. See Burnside’s
report, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the
War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 906 (hereafter cited as
OR, followed by part, volume, and page number—all series are 1).
13
Marvel, Burnside, 355.
14
Rhea, Wilderness, 331.
15
Theodore Lyman, Meade’s Headquarters 1863-1865 (Boston:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922), 94.
16
Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of
the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886), 427.
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never up to the mark when the tug comes.” Wainwright
also commented on Burnside’s subordinate officers, saying,
“I got a very poor impression of the corps.” 17
Following the tactical stalemate at the Wilderness,
which resulted in little other than close to 30,000 casualties,
Grant decided to shift his forces south, towards
Spotsylvania Court House. Burnside’s men moved back
towards Chancellorsville and then began sliding further
south, reaching the Fredericksburg Road on May 9. This
road ran straight from Fredericksburg to Grant’s objective
of Spotsylvania Court House. When Burnside’s men
reached the road, they now served as the Federals’ left
flank. 18
With Orlando Willcox’s division leading the way
down the Fredericksburg Road, Burnside soon a problem
that would plague the entire Federal command. Bad maps
had been distributed before the campaign began and now,
with Grant trying to issue orders to both Burnside and
Meade’s Army of the Potomac, the problems associated
with those maps bubbled to the surface. First was the maps’
quality—Theodore Lyman wrote that the maps were
17

Charles W. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle, edited by Allan Nevins
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1998), 352.
18
On the Wilderness’ casualties, see Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody
Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864 (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 341; on the movement of the Ninth
Corps see Burnside’s OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 907-908; Spotsylvania Court
House serving as Grant’s objective can be found in Gordon C. Rhea,
The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow
Tavern: May 7-12, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1997), 13.

86

Burnside and Spotsylvania

printed “on wretched spongy paper, which wore out after
being carried a few days in the pocket….” Furthermore,
Lyman pointed out that many of the maps had key points
on them entirely out of position—pertinent to the Battle of
the Spotsylvania Court House was the fact that the
courthouse itself was portrayed “two and one half miles to
the west [from where it is actually located].” 19
Most problematic to Burnside on May 9 was the
issue of the location of a “Gate”, as well as the Gayle
house. This problem would resonate through the next
couple of days of the battle, culminating with the fighting
on May 12. Grant issued orders to Burnside, ordering him
to send “a small force from Gate toward Spotsylvania to
reconnoiter the roads and enemy’s position in that
direction, and especially have all roads leading to your
right… examined… and whether they lead to the positions
occupied by General Meade’s forces…..” 20 In other words,
Willcox, whose division was leading the corps, was to
skirmish ahead and see which roads, if any, could link up
with the Army of the Potomac so that the Federal line could
be one solid front.
There are numerable problems with this order, but
the main concern is the usage of “Gate.” Going back to the
horrendous maps, it appears that “Gate” was mentioned on
both Grant’s and Meade’s maps, but not Burnside’s. The
choice to write Gate as a proper noun also implies that
19

Theodore Lyman, “Uselessness of Maps,” in The Wilderness
Campaign May-June 1864, Volume IV (Boston: The Military Historical
Society of Massachusetts), 79-80.
20
OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 580.
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Grant and Meade both believed that the Gate was the
property of a local. There was indeed a gate along the Ninth
Corps’ advance, but it was just that—a toll gate, not a large
house, and furthermore, it was far to the rear of Willcox’s
advance. Nonetheless, Willcox pushed on ahead, towards
the Gayle house, a structure on the north-eastern side of the
river. There his skirmishers ran into Confederate pickets of
infantry and dismounted cavalry and the two sides began to
open a lively fire. Willcox reported back to Burnside that
he had “Found the enemy’s vedettes one-half mile before
reaching Gayle’s house.” 21 Reporting back to Grant,
Burnside reiterated the “Gayle” house. And then, in a snafu
classic for military history, both Grant and Burnside
assumed the other was misspelling the g-word—whether it
was “Gate” or “Gayle” and neither asked for clarification.
It didn’t help that on the map that Grant possessed, the gate
was marked where the Gayle house actually stood. 22
At the end of the day on May 9, Willcox had
nonetheless pushed across the Ni River and drove away the
Confederate pickets. From his current position Willcox was
only about 1.5 miles away from Spotsylvania Court House,
and ahead of him lay just more Confederate pickets—had
the Third Division pressed down the road, the likelihood of
capturing the courthouse and its vital crossroads was very
21

OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 581; for detailed topographic maps of the
Spotsylvania area, see map series “Battle of Spotsylvania Court
House”, produced by Steven Stanley, 2000.
22
William D. Matter, If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of
Spotsylvania (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988),
110.
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high. The Federal high command’s faulty cartography
depicted the distance between the Ni River crossing and
Spotsylvania as 3.5 miles, however. Gordon C. Rhea
summarizes this whole episode as “Burnside missed a
superb opportunity.” 23 Later that night Burnside finally
tried to clear up the confusion, writing, “The position
occupied by General Willcox is at Mr. Gayle’s house, there
being no such place as Gate in this section….” 24 The note
apparently did not stick; in his postwar history of the
campaign, Meade’s chief of staff Andrew Humphreys
wrote that “General Burnside moved with the Ninth
Corps… to Gate’s house, on the road from [Spotsylvania]
Court House to Fredericksburg, and then toward the Court
House, crossing the [Ni] at Gate’s house (a mile and a half
from the Court House)….” 25 At least by the 1880s
Humphreys had learned the true distance from the river to
Spotsylvania.
If May 9 had been difficult for Burnside in trying to
get through the ambiguous orders, May 10 was difficult
because Burnside lost his “ablest division commander.” 26
Brigadier General Thomas Stevenson brought his First
Division forward to support Willcox’s command in
solidifying their front on the southern side of the Ni River.
Seeking some shade (the mercury recorded 89 degrees at 2

23

Matter, 110; Rhea, Spotsylvania, 103.
Burnside to Grant, OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 583.
25
Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864-1865 (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 72.
26
Rhea, Spotsylvania, 182.
24
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PM in Washington City—65 miles north), 27 Stevenson
lounged about and smoked cigars with his staff. Then,
breaking the brief reprieve in an extremely bloody fashion,
a bullet cracked through the back of Stevenson’s head,
toppling him over. The twenty-eight year old Brigadier
General was dead almost instantly. Burnside wrote that
Stevenson’s death was a “severe misfortune” and that the
general had “on all occasions proved himself an efficient
soldier.” 28 As Stevenson’s body was sent back to Boston,
Colonel Daniel Leasure took over command of the First
Division. One of his new staff officers wrote, “I had a
favorable opinion of him, but I can’t say I retain it.” 29 Over
the course of the next day Burnside was hesitant to further
use the division under Leasure.
By May 10, the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
was into its third day. By this point of the battle
Confederate engineers had laid out their defensive works—
the most famous being the Mule Shoe Salient. Measuring
“1,800 yards wide at the base and 1,320 yards deep from
the base to the tip”, 30 the Mule Shoe was truly massive and
also proved to be a liability for its Confederate defenders; a
salient can be attacked from three sides at once, making it
27

Robert K. Krick, Civil War Weather in Virginia (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 2007), 129.
28
Derek Smith, The Gallant Dead: Union and Confederate Generals
Killed in the Civil War (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005), 230;
Burnside’s OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 908-909.
29
Marvel, Burnside, 360.
30
Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field
Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2007), 47.

90

Burnside and Spotsylvania

difficult to defend. As Lee’s line continued, the
Confederate engineers followed the natural contour lines of
the ridge they were on and dug a second salient, this one “a
minor protrusion in comparison [to the Mule Shoe]… The
trench was over five feet deep, and pine logs topped the
parapet.” 31 This second salient would be guarded mostly by
men of Henry Heth’s division, thus the position got its
name—Heth’s Salient. These works would soon become
the focus of major Federal attacks.
There was little fighting on Burnside’s front on May
11, but plenty of maneuvering. As Grant planned his big
offensive against Lee’s line for the next day, the Ninth
Corps spent the majority of the day re-crossing the Ni River
back to the north side. In the midst of driving rain storms,
this proved difficult to do. Once the high command realized
what was going on, the corps was ordered to re-cross the
river again and regain their works on the south side of the
river. The end result was that the Ninth Corps spent the
majority of May 11 in the rain marching back and forth
only to end up in the exact same place as they had started,
only now exhausted and soaked to the bone. Burnside
denied ordering the move, as did Grant—historian William
Matter writes that “Until more evidence is uncovered, this
episode will remain a mystery.” 32
In the meantime, the soldiers of the Ninth Corps
suffered for the lack of shelter. One solder in the 57th
Massachusetts wrote, “The afternoon of the 11th [of May]
31
32

Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee, 58-59.
Matter, If it Takes All Summer, 174.
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was rainy, which continued through the night. The FiftySeventh rested upon their arms without shelter of any kind,
the ground was wet and the men’s clothing also, with no
opportunity of getting dry; sleep was impossible….”33
Another soldier in the 7th Rhode Island added, “The rain
poured in torrents over the hundreds lying around. Few had
blankets.” 34 For all of their marches, the soldiers did not
reach their trenches until about 10:00 PM, which meant
they had about six hours to lie around in the mud until
going forward. 35
While the Ninth Corps moved about and struggled
with the elements, Burnside got his orders for the next
day’s attack. Grant’s message to Burnside was timestamped at 4:00 PM, but the latter probably did not get the
order “until near dark”—sunset on May 11 was three
minutes shy of 7:00 PM. 36 In his orders, Grant wrote that
“You will move against the enemy with your entire force
promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o’clock
to-morrow morning. Let your preparations for this attack be
conducted with the utmost secrecy, and veiled entirely from
the enemy.” 37 To assist Burnside, Grant ordered two of his

33

John Anderson, The Fifty-Seventh Regiment of Massachusetts
Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion (Boston: E.B. Stillings & Co.,
1896), 80.
34
William Palmer Hopkins, The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island
Volunteers in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (Boston: Hub Engraving Co.,
1903), 169.
35
Rhea, Spotsylvania, 218.
36
Marvel, Burnside, 362, Krick, Civil War in Virginia, 129.
37
OR, Vol. 36, pt. 2, 643.
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aides, Cyrus Comstock and Orville Babcock, to attach
themselves to the Ninth Corps staff and direct the attacks.
After getting his orders Burnside began to plan his
corps’ attacks. Some have criticized Burnside for his lack
of overall preparations in these stages of the battle—one
historian writes that he was “befuddled” and “dithered” in
front of the enemy on May 10, and he characterized
Burnside’s fighting on May 12 as “a spectacle of
embarrassing confusion.” 38 Ambrose Burnside serves as an
easy target for these historians as the debacle at
Fredericksburg will always stain his name, but it is unfair
to claim that Burnside did nothing but spew incompetence;
in the midst of the Ninth Corps’ preparations on the night
of May 11 it is important to remember Grant’s warning to
keep the movements an “utmost secrecy, and veiled
entirely from the enemy,” a line that his two aides also
reiterated. 39 In this setting, it is easy to understand why
Burnside was hesitant to send scouts forward to reconnoiter
the ground, especially when Comstock, one of the aides
from Grant, had already done so earlier in the day, could
provide Burnside with whatever directions the he needed.
Furthermore, after arriving at Burnside’s headquarters in
the dark, “Comstock suggested no reconnaissance.” 40

38

John Cannan, Spotsylvania Campaign: May 7-21 (Conshohocken:
Combined Books, 1997), 98; John Cannan, Bloody Angle: Hancock’s
Assault on the Mule Shoe Salient May 12, 1864 (Cambridge: Da Capo
Press, 2002), 135.
39
See Note 37.
40
Comstock’s reconnaissance is found in Rhea, Spotsylvania, 215;
Marvel, Burnside, 362.
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In the midst of all this, another curveball was
thrown at Burnside when Major General Thomas L.
Crittenden arrived and took over command of the corps’
First Division. 41 Crittenden was another general whose
presence threatened to upend the army’s hierarchy; his
major general’s commission dated from July 17, 1862, four
months before George Meade. 42 By assigning Crittenden to
the independent Ninth Corps, the matter of commissions
were avoided, but Crittenden had other baggage he brought
along. In the Chickamauga Campaign in the early fall of
1863 Crittenden had commanded the Army of the
Cumberland’s Twenty-First Corps, totaling almost 11,000
infantrymen. 43 With his defeat at Chickamauga, William S.
Rosecrans looked for scapegoats, and one of those men was
Crittenden. In late January of 1864, a court of inquiry was
established to “investigate the conduct of” three generals,
including Crittenden. 44 Over the next twenty-one days the
court heard testimony and examined the Battle of
Chickamauga in detail before it absolved Crittenden and
wrote, “The evidence… respecting General Crittenden’s
operations… not only shows no cause for censure, but, on
the contrary, that his whole conduct was most
creditable….” 45 Though absolved, the court was still a stain
41

OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 909.
Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 100.
43
Crittenden’s force is tallied up from figures compiled in David A.
Powell, The Chickamauga Campaign: August 22-September 19, 1863
(El Dorao Hills: Savas Beatie, 2014), 639-641.
44
OR, Vol. 30, pt. 1, 930.
45
Ibid., 996.
42
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on Crittenden, and whereas he had commanded close to
11,000 troops at Chickamauga, his First Division command
in the Ninth Corps now only tallied about 2,100. 46
With poor maps, a tired and soaked corps, and a
new division commander with only a couple of hours’
experience in command, Ambrose Burnside prepared his
attack in the early morning hours of Thursday, May 12,
1864. According to orders, Robert Potter’s Second Division
left their works around four in the morning and began to
slide north, looking to link up with Hancock’s Second
Corps. By punctually ordering Potter’s division up, Gordon
C. Rhea says Burnside was “displaying unaccustomed
vigor”, but Burnside biographer William Marvel would
disagree with this assessment, writing “Burnside had never
had much trouble holding up his end of a schedule
before[.]” 47 Either way, Potter’s force of about 5,700 men
crashed through the woods and struck the eastern salient of
the Mule Shoe just minutes after Hancock’s men had
completely shattered the top of it.48 The Confederate
defenders of the tip of the salient were almost all captured
en masse, leaving Hancock’s men with some 2,700
prisoners to take care of. 49 However, the success also came
46

Troop strength comes from Collins’ strength of First Division before
the Wilderness, 168, and subtracting 535 casualties, as evidenced in
OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 131. This figure does not account for any casualties
the First Division would have suffered on May 10 or 11 due to
skirmishing.
47
Rhea, Spotsylvania, 244; Marvel, Burnside, 473 (n. 25).
48
Potter’s strength, Collins, 168.
49
Alfred C. Young III, Lee’s Army during the Overland Campaign: A
Numerical Study (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2013), 236
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with problems. An officer in Hancock’s corps wrote that,
“All line and formation was now lost…Amid the wild
confusion of the glorious success, it was difficult to
preserve order.” 50 In this confused melee, Potter’s three
brigades hit below Hancock and got some of their own
spoils, including two captured cannon. 51
The confusion of the Federal breakthrough assisted
the Confederate response immensely. Gathering his brigade
of almost 2,000 North Carolinians, James Lane pushed up
to the edge of the salient. As other Confederate brigades,
mostly from Ewell’s Second Corps, were hitting Hancock,
Lane focused his attention on Potter’s men. His five
regiments in tow, Lane moved forward and later wrote, “In
the best of spirits the brigade welcomed the furious assault,
which soon followed, with prolonged cheers and death
dealing volleys[.]” 52
Lane’s men were soon joined by the combined
weight of the 2,500 men present in Alfred Scales’ and
Edward Thomas’ brigades. The three Confederate brigades
soon proved too much for Potter’s men and the Federals
gave ground, even giving up the two cannon they had
captured earlier. Potter wrote in his report, “The connection
on our right with the Second Corps being broken… we
were forced out of the enemy’s work with a few prisoners.”
50

St. Clair A. Mulholland, The Story Of The 116th Regiment
Pennsylvania Volunteers In the War of the Rebellion (Philadelphia: F.
McManus, Jr & Co., 1903), 209.
51
OR, Vol. 36, pt. 1, 928.
52
Young, 246; Lane’s Report in Southern Historical Society Papers:
Volume 9, 146.
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By 8:00 AM Potter’s men were out of their breach and
spent the rest of the day trading shots with the rebels to
their immediate front as well as small sorties against the
rebel works which accomplished little.53
As Burnside tried to get a handle on the fighting to
his front, Grant pushed him to send more troops in.
Increasingly frustrated at his commander’s impatience,
Burnside crumpled up and threw on the ground one
dispatch and, at another demand, verbally snapped at
Comstock. The firing continued at its heaviest near the
western salient of the Mule Shoe, which would soon get its
infamous name of the Bloody Angle. Hoping to help,
Burnside ordered more attacks, this time not at the eastern
salient, but at the rebel positions further south—at Heth’s
Salient. 54
Thomas Crittenden’s First Division was picked for
this task, and its two brigades began to advance through the
swampy ravines and bottomlands, crashing through the
woods closer and closer to Heth’s line. But with
Crittenden’s newness to the division, combind with the two
brigades’ near-total exhaustion, the fighting formation did
not make it far. As the Federals stumbled towards Heth’s
Salient, the Confederates behind their works readied their
rifles. The rebels in these works belonged to the two
brigades of Joseph Davis and Robert Mayo, who together
had about 2,300 men. As soon as Crittenden’s men came
53
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into view, the two brigades opened fire. Heth, who
ironically had been roommates with Burnside at West
Point, wrote, “[Crittenden’s] attack was met with firmness
and repelled with gallantry. The enemy left many dead and
wounded in our front. A stand of colors was captured
during this affair….” 55 Adding to his rather stoic report,
Heth allowed himself some more prose in his memoirs,
where he added, “On the [12th] of May my breastworks
[were] vigorously assailed by General Burnside… the
attacking force, or some of them, came within thirty paces
of my breastworks; at the same time my infantry poured a
shower of lead into Burnside’s troops. They were exposed
to a raking fire of my artillery on my right, where I had
some twenty pieces in position.” 56
Crittenden’s repulse left Burnside with only
Orlando Willcox’s division. The corps’ Third Division
moved off towards the salient, hoping to break through in
one-last attempt. With the fighting at the Bloody Angle
having descended into a maddened killing spree of little
overall importance, Burnside’s ultimate objective was to
break through Heth’s Salient, forcing Lee to move men
away from the Mule Shoe, potentially opening the door to a
final Federal success. Willcox’s two brigades moved off in
the same fashion as Crittenden, whose disjointed fragments
also tried to join the attack. Joining the infantry were four
55
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batteries of guns under the Ninth Corps Chief of Artillery,
Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin. 57 As Willcox’s two brigades,
under John Hartranft and Benjamin Christ, advanced they
soon came under the same fire that had met Crittenden’s
division, together with an added thrust—a Confederate
counter-attack of two brigades, centered against Willcox’s
left and aimed straight at the four batteries of artillery.
Looking to do the exact same thing as Grant, but in
reverse, Robert E. Lee looked to take pressure off the Mule
Shoe, and saw the easiest way to do so would be to hit the
Federal left—Burnside’s corps. Willcox’s attack was timed
almost perfectly to the same moment that the Confederate
attack struck out from the right flank of Heth’s Salient. The
two brigades belonged to David Weisiger and James Lane,
the latter having already repulsed Robert Potter earlier in
the morning. As Lane’s men led the attack, though, they
“commenced yelling too soon and drew upon themselves a
terrible fire of canister from four of the guns…” 58
The fighting around Benjamin’s batteries descended
into chaos. Willcox wrote in his diary, “At one time the
enemy was within ten paces, but the 2nd Michigan,
supporting this battery, re-manned the guns and with the
aid of canister of the other batteries, repulsed the charge
splendidly.” 59 While the fighting swirled about the
batteries, the musketry from within Heth’s Salient
57
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continued to hit Willcox’s brigades from the front, and
Willcox noted that “my front line suffered severely in
killed, wounded, and prisoners….” 60 Especially caught in
the middle, not only by the fire to their front, but also by
Weisiger’s and Lane’s counter-attack, the 17th Michigan
nearly ceased to exist—“only four dozen men escaped.” 61
Though it was able to repulse Weisiger and Lane,
Willcox’s division’s attack was spent before it really got a
chance to get underway. The attack slunk back to its
defensive works, ending, for all practical purposes, the
fighting around Heth’s Salient on May 12.
So ended Ambrose Burnside’s attacks on May 12 at
Spotsylvania. Strategically, why were they important? In
his memoirs, Grant perhaps expressed it best when he
wrote, “Burnside accomplished but little of a positive
nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from
reinforcing his [center] from that quarter.” 62 In other words,
Burnside’s attacks kept portions of three Confederate
divisions (Heth, Cadmus Wilcox, and William Mahone)
away from the Mule Shoe—troops that could have been
used to tip the balance and completely evict the Federal
breakthrough. Others, however, were not so willing to see
what Burnside had accomplished. Only knowing that
Burnside failed to break Heth’s line, a staff officer in the
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Sixth Corps wrote that Burnside was a “[damned]
humbug.” 63
It is difficult to get an understanding of the casualty
counts for the Ninth Corps as well as the Confederates from
the fighting near Heth’s Salient. In his report, Burnside
claimed that the corps had lost 1,500 killed, wounded, and
captured, but that figure also included losses in the days
following May 12. Confederate counts encompass the
entirety of the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, which
for Henry Heth, meant stand-up fights against the Second
Corps in the days before fighting against Burnside. For the
entire battle, Heth’s division suffered 350 casualties, while
Lane’s brigade, which seemed to be everywhere on May
12, claimed 470 casualties for the day. 64
Had Burnside broken through at Heth’s Salient, it
would have broken open Lee’s line. After the collapse of
the Mule Shoe, Lee had his engineers, joined by soldiers
who were routed from the initial clash there work
feverishly on a fallback line, digging into the wet earth with
“pick and shovel.” 65 However, that fallback line ran along
with, and incorporated Heth’s Salient. Had any of
Burnside’s attacks broken through, the entirety of the new
line would be useless as the Ninth Corps came crashing
down onto the unfinished trench system. From there, Lee’s
63
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options and his defensive nature against Grant would have
been severely limited.
But Burnside did not break through. He did not
break through because of the actions of the Confederates at
Heth’s Salient, who held steady in the face of three separate
attacks, and even managed their own attack that sent
Willcox’s division sprawling back in confusion. Any
discussion of what might have been beyond this is mere
conjecture and opinion. For all the damage done, the
bloodletting was not over. The armies would move steadily
south, all the way to Petersburg, where a mine, an
explosion, and a bloody crater waited for Major General
Ambrose Burnside.

102

Burnside and Spotsylvania

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Albert, Allen D, editor. History of the Forty-Fifth Regiment
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry 18611865. Williamsport, PA: Grit Publishing Company,
1912.
Anderson, John. The Fifty-Seventh Regiment of
Massachusetts Volunteers in the War of the
Rebellion. Boston: E.B. Stillings & Co., 1896.
Cullum, George W. Biographical Register of Officers and
Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy , at West
Point, N.Y: Volume 1. New York: D. Van Nostrand,
1868).
_______. Biographical Register of the Officers and
Graduates of the Military Academy at West Point,
N.Y., Volume 2. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868.
Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil
War. Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 1889.
Grant, Ulysses S. Memoirs and Selected Letters. New
York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1990
reprint.
Heth, Henry. Heth’s Report of Spring 1864 to October
1864, unpublished, Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania
National Military Park Archives.

103

Quint

_____. Memoirs of Henry Heth. Edited by James L.
Morrison. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974.
Holmes, Oliver Wenndell Jr. Touched with Fire: Civil War
Letters and Diary of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr,
1861-1864. Edited by Mark De Wolfe Howe.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946.
Hopkins, William Palmer. The Seventh Regiment Rhode
Island Volunteers in the Civil War, 1862-1865.
Boston: Hub Engraving Co., 1903.
Humphreys, Andrew. The Virginia Campaign of 18641865. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883.
Lyman, Theodore “Uselessness of Maps.” In The
Wilderness Campaign May-June 1864, Volume 4.
Boston: The Military Historical Society of
Massachusetts.
______. Meade’s Headquarters 1863-1865. Boston:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922.
McKeever, C. Civil War Battle Flags of the Union Army
and Order of Battle. New York: Knickerbocker
Press, 1997 reprint.
Mulholland, St. Clair A. The Story Of The 116th Regiment
Pennsylvania Volunteers In the War of the
Rebellion. Philadelphia: F. McManus, Jr & Co.,
1903.

104

Burnside and Spotsylvania

Lane, James H. “Battle of Spotsylvania Court-House —
Report of General Lane.” In Southern Historical
Society Papers: Volume 9.
United States War Department. Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the
Rebellion. Washington: Government Printing Press,
1880-1901.
Wainwright, Charles W. A Diary of Battle. Edited by Allan
Nevins. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1998.
Walker, Francis A. History of the Second Army Corps in
the Army of the Potomac. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1886.
Willcox, Orlando B. Forgotten Valor: The Memoirs,
Journals, & Civil War Letters of Orlando B.
Willcox. Edited by Robert Garth Scott. Kent State
University of Press, 1999.
Woodbury, Augustus. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside
and the Ninth Army Corps: A Narrative of
Campaigns. Providence: Sidney S. Rider & Brother,
1867.
Secondary Sources
Cannan, John. Bloody Angle: Hancock’s Assault on the
Mule Shoe Salient May 12, 1864. Cambridge: Da
Capo Press, 2002.
_______. Spotsylvania Campaign: May 7-21.
Conshohocken: Combined Books, 1997.
105

Quint

Collins, Darrell L., Army of the Potomac: Order of Battle,
1861-1865, with Commanders, Strengths Losses,
and More. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2013.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants: Volume 3.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944.
Greene, A. Wilson. “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud.” In The
Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the
Rappahannock edited by Gary W. Gallagher.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1995.
Hess, Earl J. Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field
Fortifications in the Overland Campaign. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
Krick, Robert K. Civil War Weather in Virginia.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007.
Marvel, William. Burnside. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1991.
Matter, William D., If It Takes All Summer: The Battle of
Spotsylvania. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1988.
O’Reilly, Francis A. The Fredericksburg Campaign:
Winter War on the Rappahannock. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: The Second Day. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

106

Burnside and Spotsylvania

Powell, David A. The Chickamauga Campaign: August 22September 19, 1863. El Dorao Hills: Savas Beatie,
2014.
Rhea, Gordon C. The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6,
1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1994.
_____. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the
Road to Yellow Tavern: May 7-12, 1864. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.
Simpson, Brooks D. Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over
Adversity, 1822-1865. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
2000.
Smith, Derek. The Gallant Dead: Union and Confederate
Generals Killed in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg:
Stackpole Books, 2005.
Stanley, Steven. Map series “Battle of Spotsylvania Court
House.” 2000.
Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The
Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864. New
York: Ballantine Books, 1989.
Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union
Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1964.
Young, Alfred C. III. Lee’s Army during the
Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2013.
107

